The war around Iran may only be the beginning. Increasingly, the language coming from Israeli political circles suggests that the next strategic target could be Türkiye.

How long the joint U.S.–Israeli bombardment of Iran will last remains uncertain. What is clearer, however, is Israel’s strategic objective.

The aim appears to be the creation of a prolonged environment of chaos that will occupy parts of the region for years. By weakening state structures, arming various groups, and creating a cycle of violence, the region can be drawn into a prolonged period of instability. In pursuit of this objective, civilians, including women and children, are being targeted without distinction.

Israel has acted with confidence partly because of the sometimes open and mostly tacit approval it received from the United States and the European Union during the genocide in Gaza. At the same time, the inability of leaders in the Islamic world to demonstrate even minimal unity has further emboldened such actions.

The broader objective seems to be the expansion of the current “ring of fire”.

Developments over the past month, both before and after the war against Iran began, already illustrate the direction in which events in the region appear to be moving.

U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth reportedly stated that he sees no reason why the Al-Aqsa Mosque should not be demolished (and 3rd Temple built in its place).

The U.S. Ambassador to Israel, Mike Huckabee, said in an interview with Tucker Carlson that Israel could control the territory “from the Nile to the Euphrates” and that such a claim would be legitimate.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu frequently speaks of the emergence of a new “Sunni axis” against Israel and openly states that new allies will be sought to counter it,  such as India’s authoritarian leader Narendra Modi best known for his anti-Muslim policies.

Former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett recently declared that “the new Iran is Türkiye,” adding that Türkiye and President Erdoğan represent a “more sophisticated threat.”

Meanwhile, The Wall Street Journal, known for its hawkish positions, published an article arguing that US should take action in case before Türkiye fills the vacuum that may emerge from Iran and even reassess NATO partnerships.

Even during the first days of missile strikes on Iran, senior Israeli officials repeatedly mentioned Türkiye. In American think tanks that have long promoted anti-Türkiye narratives, the immediate reaction was to say: “Ankara may one day become the next Tehran.”

In other words, even before the outcome of their war against Iran becomes clear, discussions about the new war have already begun.

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Could Israel Target Türkiye?

Many observers argue that such threats are unrealistic. 

Their reasoning is straightforward: Türkiye is not Iran. It is a NATO member, one of Europe’s largest economic partners, a crucial energy corridor linking multiple regions to European markets, and a long-standing ally of the United States. From this perspective, the logic of the existing system should act as a constraint. NATO’s collective security framework would deter external aggression, European governments would resist a conflict that could severely damage their own economic interests, and Washington would have little incentive to jeopardize its relationship with a strategically important ally like Türkiye.

Yet these assumptions are becoming increasingly difficult to sustain. European leaders today struggle to demonstrate a unified commitment to international law or to the so-called “rules-based international order” they so often invoke. While few countries such as Spain have openly opposed both the war with Iran and the devastation unfolding in Gaza, they often appear largely isolated in doing so. European foreign policy, at times, seems contradictory, assertive in rhetoric yet weak in substance, and frequently shaped by pressures coming from Washington.

Europe either perceives itself as too weak to alter the course of events, or finds itself constrained by actors who benefit from the current escalation. In either case, relying on Europe as a decisive political counterweight begins to look increasingly naïve.

The situation in the United States raises similar concerns. In recent months, Washington has repeatedly appeared unable, or unwilling to restrain Israeli demands. Secretary of State Marco Rubio even acknowledged that if the United States had not acted, Israel would likely have initiated the war on its own, adding that Washington partly moved first to avoid being caught unprepared.

If this is the extent of Washington’s leverage over its closest regional ally, who is heavily reliant on US support in almost all areas, the reliability of the broader Western security architecture inevitably comes into question. A US that cannot restrain its own partner might not hesitate to sacrifice even NATO should circumstances demand it. Already, a growing number of commentators have been describing the alliance less as a coherent strategic community and more as a political prop, publicly paraded as a symbol of unity even by actors who privately recognize how limited its meaning has become.
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Is Türkiye Part of the West?

At this point, an underlying question inevitably arises: where exactly does Türkiye stand in relation to the “West”?

This question is often debated in cultural, geographical, or philosophical terms. Türkiye’s position, straddling both Europe and Asia, shaped by a Muslim-majority society yet deeply intertwined with European history, has long made it difficult to place neatly within conventional civilizational categories. The legacy of the Ottoman Empire alone illustrates this ambiguity: a state that for more than six centuries ruled Balkan, Arab, and Anatolian lands simultaneously, governed Muslims, Christians, and Jews, fought European powers for centuries yet remained deeply woven into their diplomatic and economic systems. The Ottoman world shaped Europe politically, culturally, intellectually and commercially in significant ways, just as it was itself influenced by Europe.

Yet the purpose here is not to settle civilizational arguments about identity or belonging. Rather, the aim is to look at the question in structural terms: how Türkiye is positioned within the economic, security, and institutional networks that define what we today call the “Western” bloc.

From this perspective, the first defining feature of the contemporary West is economic and institutional integration.

In modern geopolitics, the “West” functions as a dense economic and institutional network built around free-market economies, integration into global financial systems, and shared economic institutions. Türkiye is deeply embedded in this network through its customs union with the European Union, its financial integration, and its extensive participation in international economic structures.

In fact, it is currently the European Union’s fifth-largest trading partner, and trade between Türkiye and the EU has increased by 59 percent over the past five years.

It also occupies a critical position in Europe’s energy architecture. It serves as a major transit corridor connecting energy resources from the Caspian region, the Middle East, and the Eastern Mediterranean to European markets. 

A second defining dimension of the Western system is security integration.

Türkiye possesses NATO’s second-largest army and remains one of the alliance’s most operationally active militaries. It has also long been among the United States’ most consistent defense partners. Turkish defense companies now operate subsidiaries on American soil, while Türkiye’s defense exports to European countries have grown significantly in recent years.

Moreover, Türkiye’s strategic roles in crises ranging from Ukraine to Syria further underscore its importance within the broader Western security architecture.

A third important criterion concerns political structure. Western states are largely defined by multiparty electoral systems and constitutional political orders. Despite periodic tensions and evident imperfections, Türkiye has been governed by a multiparty electoral system since 1946. The roots of this political tradition extend further back. Constitutional movements and parliamentary life first emerged during the late Ottoman period with the First Constitutional Era of 1876. Although the parliament was soon suspended by Sultan Abdülhamid II, parliamentary politics returned in the early twentieth century. The early decades of the republic were marked by a single-party system under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, before the transition to competitive multiparty elections after the Second World War. Taken together, these developments reflect not a linear path but a long and evolving constitutional tradition that predates the modern republic.

At the time of writing, the mayor of Istanbul, Ekrem İmamoğlu, widely regarded as President Erdoğan’s most prominent political rival, remains in prison, a development that has intensified debates about the health of the country’s democratic institutions. Türkiye has also been a member of the Council of Europe since 1950 and continues to maintain official candidate status for European Union membership.

Viewed through these structural lenses, economic integration, security architecture, and political institutions, Türkiye is deeply embedded in what we today call the Western system. This does not mean Türkiye is culturally or historically a “Western country,” nor is that the claim being made here. The point is simply that, in practical geopolitical terms, Türkiye operates within many of the institutional networks that define the contemporary Western order.
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A West in Transition

If Israel were to wage a direct war against Türkiye, the consequences would be immense.

For this reason, many observers find such a scenario implausible.

But the question remains: would Israel actually care?

And even if it did happen, would Europe or the United States truly intervene to prevent it?

Western public opinion would almost certainly oppose such a war. In democratic systems, such opposition is supposed to carry real weight: foreign policy is expected, at least in principle, to reflect the preferences and moral limits of the societies in whose name it is conducted. Yet recent history raises an uncomfortable question: do Western governments still act in accordance with those public sentiments when they run counter to strategic choices? 

Months ago, during a discussion about the bombing of Qatar, I had a conversation with an Ethiopian colleague.

At the time, some Zionist circles had already begun threatening Türkiye as well. I argued that Türkiye’s integration into the Western system made such a scenario unlikely. My friend partly agreed but added an important warning.

“Don’t forget,” he said, “that there are circles (in the West) who carry a special resentment toward Türkiye. Both a historical resentment and a desire to break open the current regional order.”

The warning stayed with me. What has changed since that conversation is how much less far-fetched it now seems.

Recent years (even weeks) have shown that many things once believed to be secure, even on paper, are beginning to unravel.

Leaders who once spoke proudly about defending the “rules-based international order” now openly suggest that such rules no longer matter. Major Western media outlets increasingly publish arguments claiming that international law is an unnecessary obstacle in conflicts such as those involving Iran or Venezuela.

Meanwhile, academic discussion of what many experts describe as genocide or, at the very least, grave war crimes, in Gaza is increasingly restricted in universities and public institutions. Many scholars resort to self-censorship, aware of the professional risks that open discussion may carry. Organizations that once loudly championed women’s rights in other countries have, in many cases, fallen conspicuously silent while thousands of women and children are being bombed.

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What Should Türkiye Do?

The answer to this question spans multiple areas of expertise. Any proposal must therefore be made with humility. Still, several key points can be emphasized.

Despite everything, Türkiye’s integration into the Western system provides an important structural advantage. While it does not guarantee security, it makes hostile actions against Türkiye significantly more difficult to justify and sustain.

For this reason, hostile parties will prefer to isolate Türkiye politically and distance it from the Western bloc, thereby making it easier to target.

Second, relations with the United States must be managed carefully.

In many ways, the United States resembles a giant gorilla living inside your house. It is powerful, unpredictable, and impossible to ignore. No matter how strong you are, managing such a relationship requires rational strategy rather than slogans or emotional reactions.

Modern diplomacy increasingly revolves around bargaining rather than principles. Navigating this reality requires caution and strategic thinking.

Ultimately, however, the responsibility for Türkiye’s security rests on its own shoulders.

One final point should not be overlooked. Attempts to divide societies through propaganda, disinformation, and fabricated narratives are among Israel’s most effective strategies. Both citizens and political leaders must remain vigilant against such manipulation.

When confronted with external threats, Türkiye, despite its many internal disagreements, has historically demonstrated a capacity for social cohesion that many other countries lack. This paradox has deep roots. Identities in Türkiye have never formed into neat and separate blocs. Religion and secularism, state and society, city and countryside, wealth and poverty, all overlap in complex ways. Almost everyone carries a fragment of several worlds at once. In one sense, this fragmentation has long complicated the country’s nation-building project. Yet it has also acted as a powerful barrier against deeper social rupture, making complete polarization far more difficult than it often appears from the outside.